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1  “Black Gold” (heijin),  the iron triangle of organised crime, business and politics is a
major topic in the Taiwanese media and subject of many valuable studies, nearly all of
them in Chinese. Despite its societal relevance and the ample information available on
the  subject,  the  topic  was  not  accorded  much  attention  outside  Taiwan.  This  has
changed  with  the  publication  of  Ko-lin  Chin’s  book.  “Heijin”  not  only  summarises
existing primary and secondary sources in an English-language publication, but also
contributes  many new and important  insights.  Chin conducted interviews with 117
informants, among which government officials, police officers, elected deputies from
all levels of administration and 32 figures in organised crime, some major. 
2 The book is divided into three parts, each of which consists of three chapters. The first
part outlines the relevance of “Black Gold” for Taiwanese society and politics, provides
a  typology  of  Taiwan’s  crime  groups,  defines  important  terms  and  describes  the
evolution of major groups and their leaders as well as the geographical distribution of
loosely  knit  local  crime groups.  The latter,  as  the author points  out,  are  not  to  be
confused  with  the  much  better-organised,  island-wide  operating  gangs  such  as
“Bamboo United”, “Four Seas” or “Celestial Alliance”. He goes on to describe in detail
the  activities  these  groups  are  engaged  in,  ranging  from  extortion  to  gambling,
commercial sex, debt collection, settling disputes and violence. 
3 The second part explains how “big brothers”, the leaders of organised crime groups,
became  major  figures  in  Taiwan’s  economic  and  political  realms.  It  shows  how
gangsters  have  made  their  way  into  big  business  by  first  offering  services  such as
dispute  resolution  and  protection  and  later  becoming  involved  in  legitimate  and
illegitimate  business  deals  themselves,  most  of  all  in  the  construction  sector.
Economically powerful, they were still politically vulnerable, and so needed protection.
Thus, the door was opened for collusion between politicians and “Black Gold” elements,
the latter finally running for office themselves. Well-known crime bosses such as Wu
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Tse-yuan,  Lin Ming-yi  and Lo Fu-chu were thus able to become national  legislators
despite their criminal background. This model sounds familiar, and indeed Chin does
not propose his own theory, but refines and fills with empirical substance models put
forward by Taiwanese political scientists and sociologists such as Chao Yung-mao, Chen
Ming-tong and Chen Dung-sheng. Finally, the author assesses the development of Black
Gold politics, the role of the two major political parties in it and explains what makes
the election of gangsters attractive to the voters. He connects the latter issue to the
evils brought about by Black Gold politics such as vote-buying, corruption, speculation
and violence, resulting in the “degeneration of Taiwanese politics” (p. 147). 
4 The third part describes and analyses the government’s reactions against organised
crime, shows the influence of Taiwan’s major crime groups in the international arena
and offers policy suggestions for the fight against “Black Gold”. Here, Chin plausibly
argues  that  the  KMT  administration’s  strategy  of  selective  crackdowns  instead  of
institutional  reforms  had  a  self-serving  purpose  and  the  adverse  consequence  of
worsening the problem instead of solving it. “Operation Cleansweep” serves as a case in
point,  marking a watershed in the development of  organised crime in Taiwan.  One
direct result of the crackdown was the formation of the “Celestial Alliance” by several
Taiwanese gangsters who were imprisoned in the course of the crackdown. Also, as
many gangsters fled the island, so Taiwanese organised crime entered the international
arena. An entire chapter is devoted to the internationalisation of Taiwanese organised
crime.  Further,  when the  former  gang leaders  were  released  a  few years  after  the
crackdown, they wanted their positions back, resulting in bloody gang warfare and the
deterioration of gang ethics.
5 Although  the  merits  of  the  book  lie  more  in  its  superb  descriptions  and  useful
typologies than in theory-building, it  does provides convincing explanations for the
resilience of “Black Gold”. According to Chin, organised crime, business and politics
have  become  so  intricately  locked  together  that  “the  line  between  legitimacy  and
illegitimacy is blurred, and many people move back and forth across the line” (p. 19). At
the same time, as Chin’s study shows, “Black Gold” is not something confined to the
Nationalist  Party (KMT),  but  involves local-level  DPP-politicians as  well.  This  might
explain the phenomenon’s staying-power.
6 I especially enjoyed reading the lengthy passages from the interviews Chin conducted
with crime bosses, politicians of all colours and law enforcement officers. Politicians
accuse each other of collusion with “Black Gold” and downplay their own role in the
aforementioned triangle, law enforcement officers find themselves utterly powerless to
break into these structures, and crime bosses brag about how much they serve society
by settling disputes and even bid-rigging ! 
7 In this way, Chin offers an insight into the mindset of the actors that are part of the
heijin- game, how they legitimise their actions and how they view each other. But these
interviews also show that there is no consensus as to how deep “Black Gold” penetrates
Taiwanese  society.  Chin  does  his  best  to  present  pre-existing  quantitative  data  on
politicians’  and  big  enterprise  involvement  with  organised  crime,  but  the  widely
deviating  numbers  he  presents  (p.  15)  show  that  such  “indicators”  are  far  from
objective,  being  all  based  on  biased  estimations.  Unsatisfying  as  this  might  be,  it
demonstrates  another  of  Chin’s  scholarly  strengths :  he  does  not  try  to  force  an
argument, but lays open the restrictions of his research. This also becomes clear from
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the appendix on his research methods, part of which is devoted to the problems he
encountered (pp. 230-232). 
8 Despite these limitations, however, Chin seems to take a stand in the question of how
serious the problem is in Taiwan. Quoting a major gang leader and several legislators,
Chin  suggests  that  “most  politicians  were  willing  to  have  close  relationships  with
organised crime” (heidao) ; because—figures the author—the latter can help them win
votes  (p.  217).  Gangsters,  as  Chin  explains,  are  good  vote-getters  (for  others  and
themselves) especially in rural areas because of their “grassroots personality”, their
“influence”,  the  “services”  they  offer  their  constituents,  their  “generosity”,  their
ability to obtain construction funds for their constituency and because voters want to
protest against the “establishment” (pp. 128-133).  On the other hand, Chin suggests
that people in Taiwan were “outraged by the deterioration of law and order in their
society” (p. 8) and that “Black Gold” “might have ended KMT rule in Taiwan” (p. 5).
However, he does not substantiate the latter hypothesis, neither does he explain the
paradox that voters let themselves be wooed by the very people that are responsible for
their “outrage”. The root of the paradox might lie in the simplistic equation of “vote
captains” or “pillars” (zhuangjiao) with “organised criminals” (heidao) (p. 217). Given the
diverse backgrounds of the vote captains, this equation overstretches the concept of
“organised  crime”,  produces  the  misleading  assumption  that  every  Taiwanese
politician is somehow related to gangsters and underestimates the complexity of social
relations in Taiwan. 
9 I would consider this only a minor dent in Chin’s otherwise very informed work, which
is  the  most  comprehensive  and detailed  study  on the  subject  that  has  so  far  been
published.  The  reader  gains  a  deep  and  structured  insight  into  the  nature  of  the
organised  crime-business-politics  triangle  in  Taiwan  and  learns  much  about  the
methods used by either of the parties in this triangle to sustain the relationship. Its
empirical  depth  makes  it  a  must-read  for  anyone  interested  in  contemporary
Taiwanese politics, economics and sociology.
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